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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEEDING BELOW 
In late December, 2002, Ken Thomson, aged 43, a small business owner and 
resident of Meridian, Idaho, had surgery for a rotator cuff repair. An MRI of the chest 
taken for that surgery revealed a small "pericardia!" cyst. This is a cyst inside of the 
chest and can be adjacent to the esophagus and the top of the heart. It derives its name 
from being next to or attached to the pericardium, the fibrous sac surrounding the heart 
and the roots of the main arteries to the heart and lungs. The radiologist concluded it 
was a benign pericardia! cyst. On February 6, 2003, Dr. Olsen, using robotic 
instruments known as Video Assisted Thoracoscopic Surgery, or "VATS", removed the 
cyst at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. Afterwards, Mr. Thomson had a paralyzed 
left hemidiaphragm. Treating physicians at the Mayo Clinic, St. Luke's and the 
University of Utah concluded that the phrenic nerve, which must be intact for the 
diaphragm to work, had been severed or damaged during surgery. (See Appendix: 
Plaintiffs Illustrative Exhibit #41.) Dr. Olsen denied damaging the nerve. 
The Complaint alleging medical malpractice against Dr. Olsen was filed July 13, 
2005. The jury trial commenced December 6, 2006. The jury returned a verdict 
finding no breach of the standard of care. The trial court denied Plaintiffs Motion for 
New Trial. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES UPON APPEAL 
1. Demanding the jurors to rate themselves denies the right to an impartial jury. 
2. Defense witness Dr. Cushman was not disclosed, and his testimony should have 
been excluded. 
3. Email sent to Dr. Cushman which impeached his testimony should have been 
admitted into evidence. 
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4. There was no issue regarding consent. Admitting into evidence consent forms 
and allowing defense counsel to argue "risks of the surgery" was error. 
5. Damage to the phrenic nerve was not a "known complication" of the surgery. The 
"known complication" defense should not have been allowed absent a scientific 
and medical foundation. Expert testimony regarding "known complication" 
should have been barred unless there was established a basis in generally 
accepted medical practice or theory. 
I. ASKING THE JURORS TO RATE THEMSELVES ON "SYMPATHY" 
Defense attorney Hall asked the jurors to "rate themselves" on the "sympathy 
factor". The question posed was: "How do you rate yourself on the sympathy thing, on 
a basis of one to ten, where would you fall?" (See, Augmentation to Reporter's 
Transcript - Vair Dire.) Thomson's objection was over-ruled. 
This was improper. Jurors should not be mandated to state a position on this 
issue; the Court gives the proper jury instruction. Jurors are forced to admit prejudice if 
they feel any empathy. As happened, many members of the jury panel stated that they 
were sympathetic and voluntarily recused themselves or were challenged by the defense 
attorney. It is common knowledge that jurors have empathetic feelings; they are 
human. To suggest that they rate themselves on sympathy is to undercut the juror's fair 
effort to put aside sympathy as they are instructed. Asking them to engage in a rating 
system before there are any facts in evidence not only preempts the court instruction but 
also cements in the jurors' minds that they are somehow biased before the trial even 
begins. Normal people are expected to experience sympathy; the question is whether or 
not that person will be unduly swayed or whether the jury can decide the case without 
bias pursuant to the Court's instructions. Questions that are not intended to actually 
discover bias against a law or jury instruction but rather seek to determine how jurors 
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would respond to anticipated evidence and commit them to a specific verdict are not 
proper. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 SW.3d 743 (Texas 2006). 
This question came before the Connecticut Supreme Court in Lamb v. Burns, 520 
A.2d 190 (Connecticut 1987). The Connecticut Court found that questions regarding 
whether an award of money should be given to an injured party simply knowing the 
party was injured was proper, as well as questions eliciting knowledge of the law; 
however, the Connecticut Court did not question that the trial court had the right to 
prohibit questions as to how the jurors would "rate" themselves, quoting the trial court: 
"Now obviously it would be very helpful to counsel to know which are the 
most sympathetic jurors and ask them to rate themselves on a scale of one 
to ten. Then the defendant would put all those who rate themselves below 
five for the defendant. The plaintiff would pick all those who rate 
themselves higher than ten for sympathy, but that's not what the purpose 
of the voir dire is; and that's why the Court will sustain the objection to 
those two questions." 
In Dickerson v. State, 740 SW.2d 567 (1987), it was held defense counsel could not ask 
questions during voir dire if they would place "reasonable doubt" on a percentage or 
sliding scale. 
Should a trial court permit a plaintiff to ask jurors during voir dire the following: 
"On a scale of one to ten, how would you rate yourself on this question of treating a 
corporation the same as an individual?" Similarly, if plaintiffs counsel asked, "How do 
you rate yourselves on a scale of one to ten on this 'circumstantial evidence' thing?" 
Examples of this kind are too numerous to list. The point is obvious. Counsel is 
eliciting the jurors to their side, superseding the court's instruction regarding sympathy, 
apportionment of liability, treatment of a corporation, etc. The hidden agenda is "take a 
biased position before you hear any evidence." Attorneys frequently use a jury rating 
scale in determining whom they will challenge for cause. The next step is simply to have 
the jurors do the rating themselves, which accomplishes the same thing and is even 
more effective; it aligns the jurors with the defendant; it is manifestly unfair. 
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II. ALLOWING DR. AUSTIN CUSHMAN, WHO DISCUSSED THE LOCAL 
STANDARD OF CARE WITH PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT. TO TESTIFY EVEN 
THOUGH HE HAD NOT BEEN DISCLOSED PRIOR TO TRIAL AS A 
WITNESS, WAS ERROR. 
The order setting trial and cut-off dates was entered January 6, 2006 (R, Vol.1, p. 
15). Trial was set to commence December 6, 2006. Discovery cut-off was set for 60 
days prior to trial with defendant's expert witnesses to be disclosed 120 days prior to 
trial. A Rule 16(d) pre-trial conference was held November 28, 2006, prior to the start 
of trial. The Court's order stated that at pre-trial conference the parties were to discuss 
"al1 items as set forth in Rule 16(a) - G), I.R.C.P." 
Defendant Olsen filed a final list of trial witnesses on November 17, 2006. 
(Affidavit of Schlender; Exhibit A.) At no time prior to commencement of the trial did 
Olsen advise the Court or plaintiffs counsel that Austin Cushman, M.D. would be a 
witness at trial. On December 8, 2006, at the end of the first week of trial, defense 
counsel announced they would cal1 Dr. Cushman as a witness. On December 11, 2006, 
the following Monday during plaintiffs case in chief, the defense called Dr. Cushman 
out of turn. Objection was stated by plaintiffs counsel; Dr. Cushman had not been 
disclosed in a timely manner as per the court's pre-trial order. (TR., Vol. 1, p. 582.) The 
Court allowed Dr. Cushman to testify. (TR. Vol. 1, p. 588.) Dr. Cushman testified on 
December 13. He acknowledged that Dr. Shuman had a telephone conversation with 
him concerning local standards. He denied however that he had told Dr. Shuman that 
he had performed chest surgeries or that he knew the local standard of care for thoracic 
surgeons performing the type of surgery Dr. Olsen performed on Mr. Thomson: removal 
of a pericardia! cyst in the chest. He told the jury he was not qualified to render an 
opinion about chest surgery in Boise, Idaho; he did not tell Dr. Shuman the standard of 
care for chest surgeons. (TR., Vol. 1, p. 878-882.) 
The testimony of Dr. Cushman was devastating to plaintiffs case. He refuted key 
elements of Dr. Shuman's expert witness testimony. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -4 
Plaintiff called as their expert witness on the standard of care Robert L. Shuman, 
M.D. of Long Beach, California. Dr. Shuman is a thoracic surgeon trained in both 
general and cardiac surgery and board certified in cardio-thoracic surgery. (TR., Vol. 1., 
p. 2000-2003). Dr. Shuman testified that he had discussed the standard of care in 
Boise, Idaho for thoracic surgeons in 2003 with Dr. Austin Cushman, whom he 
described at trial as "a general and vascular surgeon here in Boise". Dr. Shuman 
described his conversation with Dr. Cushman as follows: 
"A. Cushman, I guess. Cushman is a general and vascular surgeon here 
in Boise. And so I asked him if he was familiar with VATS lung operations 
for removal of pericardial cysts; and he said he was. 
"I asked him who was doing the surgery in Boise. And he said, at the 
time that I called him, that pretty much it was being done by the 
cardiovascular thoracic surgeons, but that before they had been here in 
significant numbers, he had been doing surgery of that type. He had been 
doing more open operations in the chest. 
"And so he was familiar with the operation, he was familiar with the 
pathology. And I said: If you're operating to remove this cyst -
"Q. First, before you get there, let me ask you this question, Doctor. Did 
you ask him about a specific time and place? 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. And what time period did you ask him about? 
"A. Well, I said the time period that we're talking about is February of 
'03. So that's our frame of reference. 
"Q. Did he tell you he resided here in Boise, Idaho? 
"A. He did, yes. 
"Q. Did you make an inquiry as to what area or what locale you needed to 
know that about? 
"A. I don't think I understand. 
"Q. What city, or where were you asking as to the standard of care? 
"A. Well, Boise. 
"Q. And did he - did you explain to him the type of issues that you had 
that you were investigating? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And tell the jury about that. 
"A. Well, basically I said if this operating is being done by a trained 
physician, and if the phrenic nerve is paralyzed following this operation, is 
that a breach of the standard of care in Boise, Idaho -
(Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 222 - 225) 
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Defense counsel requested of the Court that plaintiff be required to make an offer 
of proof outside the presence of the jury, which was done. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 225 - 237, 1.8). 
Under examination by Dr. Olsen's counsel, Dr. Shuman once again stated Dr. Cushman 
had told him he was a vascular surgeon and that he had done thoracic surgery in the 
past or had assisted with it; Dr. Cushman advised him he had knowledge of the standard 
of care for chest surgery to remove a pericardia} cyst as that standard existed in 
February of 2003: 
"DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) 
BY MR. SCHLENDER: 
"Q. Dr. Shuman, when you talked with Dr. Austin, did you tell him you 
were investigating a specific case? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And did you tell him the time period of that case? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. And you told him what? 
"A. I told him that it revolved around a pericardia] cyst that was done by 
a VATS procedure through the left chest and resulted in permanent 
damage to the phrenic nerve. 
"Q. And when you asked him about that, did he indicate to you that he 
had actual knowledge of the standard of care for that period of time? 
"A. Yes, he did. 
"Q. February of 2003? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. He was still actively practicing as a surgeon? 
"A. He was actively practicing, and certainly was aware of what goes on at 
the hospitals. Many hospitals have M and M, morbidity and mortality 
conferences, and complications are presented or they're certainly known 
and talked about in the hallway. He was aware of the standard of care, 
from what he told me." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 234 l.13 -235, I. 16) 
The Court allowed Dr. Cushman to be called to testify. 
"THE COURT: And here is the reason why. What I said was, if Dr. 
Cushman now comes in and testifies before this court and then I make a 
judgment on whether or not I believe that Dr. Shuman really did hear Dr. 
Cushman tell him all these things that he said that he holds him, if Dr. 
Cushman's affidavit testimony holds up to that scrutiny and holds up to 
cross-examination, I would probably - I think there's a real good 
possibility that I might find that Dr. Cushman - at least there is a 
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possibility that I would find that Dr. Cushman is telling the truth, and that 
means that Dr. Shuman wasn't. Maybe that's what I'll find. 
"And I guess what I'm saying is, if Dr. Cushman's testimony from his 
affidavit stands up and if that's all they had, I would say no, he hasn't 
familiarized himself with the standard of care. 
So the affidavit is already in the record. I don't know if you want to 
call Dr. Cushman and flesh out the record a little bit more or not, Mr. Hall. 
"MR. HALL: And it's two questions: Do I call him and do that with you 
and then do we do it in front of the jury, too, to impeach the testimony? 
""THE COURT: That's kind of a judgment call. I would allow you to call 
Dr. Cushman and testify on that subject if you wanted to do that, simply to 
impeach him. And maybe if you're going to call him anyway, you could 
just call him in front of the jury and off we go." 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 700 l.7- p. 701 l.14) 
Whether or not to allow testimony from a witness not properly disclosed is in the 
first instance a matter of discretion for the trial court. Burgess v. Salmon River Canal 
Co. 127 Idaho 565, 903 P.2d 730, 738 (1995). To determine whether the trial court 
abused its discretion, the Court considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as 
discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent 
with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 
(2000). 
In the instant case, the trial court did not enter a pre-trial conference order which 
set a deadline for the disclosure of witnesses per I.R.C.P. 16(b). The parties did not 
enter into a pre-trial stipulation pursuant to Rule 16(e), I.R.C.P. A scheduling 
conference pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(b) was held, and an Order was entered on January 6, 
2006, setting the trial as well as deadlines for discovery, disclosure of experts and 
motions. The Order states on page 3 thereof, paragraph 9, the following: 
"9) ATTORNEYS CONFERENCE: Counsel for Plaintiff shall convene an 
attorneys conference two weeks prior to final pre-trial 
conference for the purposes of exchange and marking of all 
exhibits, exchange of all witness lists, the noting of any foundational 
objections to exhibits or witnesses, stipulate to uncontested facts, explore 
all settlement possibilities, and prepare a pre-trial stipulation pursuant to 
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Rule 16(c), I.R.C.P., which stipulation will be presented to this Court at the 
final pre-trial conference." (emphasis added) 
Paragraph 12 of the same Order states the following: 
12) SANCTIONS: Failure to comply with this Order shall subject a party 
or its attorney to appropriate sanctions, including but not limited to, costs 
and reasonable attorney fees, the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs 
claim, or the striking of a Defendant's defenses. A party may be 
excused from strict compliance with any provisions of this 
Order only upon motion showing extraordinary circumstances. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Court did not leave it to the parties to disclose witnesses whenever they 
wanted to; witnesses were to be disclosed not later than two weeks prior to the final pre-
trial conference which was held November 28, 2006. Thomson's counsel pointed out to 
the Court that Dr. Cushman was not disclosed: 
"MR. SCHLENDER: Yes, Your Honor. If it please the court, as per this 
court's pretrial order, November 14th, 2006, was the last date as per your 
pretrial order to disclose all witnesses, not just Rule 16 but your order said 
all witnesses. 
"The deposition of Dr. Shuman had been taken, and the conversation 
between - or the revelation or discussion between Mr. Hall and Dr. 
Shuman as to Dr. Cushman took place of November 2, 2006. So almost 
two weeks had expired from then to when they were to name all the 
witnesses pas per this court's order. 
"The proposed witness list was delivered to us on or about November 
- we have 11h, but I'm not quibbling that it's late. Because we were all 
agreeing to do certain things out of turn. 
"But in any event, in this Dr. Cushman's name is not listed. He is not 
listed at all as a witness. 
"THE COURT: Well, he is a rebuttal witness, though. Right? 
"MR. SCHLENDER: That is exactly, if he is going to be anything, is 
absolutely correct. And as the court ruled in Perry v. Magic Regional, I'll 
be short. I know the court has got a jury out there. Give this some 
thought, please. I'd respect it, Your Honor. 
"Perry v. Magic Regional is an almost identical situation in that 
they said we have an impeachment person, somebody that can impeach 
something that happened in plaintiffs case and we haven't revealed it until 
now and we want to do this. 
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"And Judge Meehl trying the case said sorry. What you really are 
doing is rebuttal, and you should have made that portion of your case and 
revealed that person as a rebuttal witness, not called an impeachment 
because you knew in advance that this would come up, such as here they 
knew about Cushman. 
"The Idaho Supreme Court sustained that and said that was the 
correct ruling, that they couldn't hide behind the guise and say well, now 
we have a rebuttal witness, when they knew they should have listed him. 
That would have given us an opportunity to do our investigation of Dr. 
Shuman to do whatever we needed to properly cross-examine him. We 
have not had that opportunity. 
"THE COURT: I see. Well, would you like to be heard on this, Ms. Duke 
or Mr. Hall? Mr. Hall, go ahead. 
"MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. I think the court is well aware of how this 
developed, and the way it really developed was a function of Dr. Shuman 
saying something on the witness stand that went beyond what he had said 
in his deposition. 
"THE COURT: That's true. 
"MR. HALL: And that is the event that has necessitated our needing to 
call him. 
We in our disclosures of witnesses said that Dr. Olsen further 
reserves the right to call any person identified by the plaintiff as a witness 
or a person with knowledge, either fact or expert, whether they are 
identified by way of a pleading, letter, discovery, deposition testimony, or 
otherwise, during the course of this litigation to discuss any matter for 
which they are competent to testify, including any matter within the scope 
of their expertise based upon their training, education, and/ or experience 
and further reserve the right to offer as testimony by deposition the 
deposition testimony of any individuals who have been deposed in this 
matter. 
That is all a function of what transpired in this courtroom. 
"THE COURT: Right. 
"MR. HALL: And what Dr. Shuman said about Dr. Cushman. So we're 
bringing in Dr. Cushman as a result of that. 
"THE COURT: I'm going to allow it .... 
"Dr. Shuman specifically testified as to what Dr. Cushman told him in 
that telephone conversation. 
"The court then received the affidavit of Austin R. Cushman, M.D., 
faxed to the court or presented to the court I believe on Friday morning, 
this last Friday morning, and said that this affidavit said what it said, and 
that's part of the record. It says look, I'm the Dr. Cushman that Dr. 
Shuman says he talked to about this stuff and I never told him that I 
assisted in these surgeries or performed this type of surgery, for example. 
"So I said well, it's not for the court to say I hereby declare that Dr. 
Cushman is telling the truth and Dr. Shuman was telling a lie. I think 
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that's up to the trier of fact. And at that time I said I would allow Dr. 
Cushman to be called as a witness to rebut the testimony and 
impeach the testimony of Dr. Shuman. It could not be done by 
affidavit because Dr. Cushman should be available to be cross-examined 
by plaintiffs counsel. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 582, L.10 - p. 588, L.17)(emphasis added) 
The trial court acknowledged that Dr. Cushman was being called to both rebut and 
impeach Dr. Shuman's testimony, apparently based on what counsel characterized as 
"Dr. Shuman saying something on the witness stand that went beyond what he had said 
in his deposition." (Tr. Vol.1, p.584, L 13-19). 
This is disingenuous. At the deposition of Dr. Shuman on November 3, 2006, 
Dr. Cushman was identified by Dr. Shuman as the doctor with whom he spoke in Boise 
regarding the local standard of care applicable to the defendant; that Dr. Cushman had 
told him he had assisted in this type of surgery at prior times and that injury to the 
phrenic nerve during such surgery fell beneath the standard of care. (Shuman 
deposition, pp. 30-31.) Defense counsel knew a month prior to trial exactly who the 
local physician was upon whom Dr. Shuman relied to establish the applicable standard 
of care for this surgery: Dr. Austin Cushman. That knowledge was gained by defense 
counsel two weeks prior to the date for filing of a final list of witnesses. 
The non-disclosure of Dr. Cushman as a defense key witness was extremely 
prejudicial, considering the plaintiff had every reason to believe that Dr. Cushman had 
reviewed the medical files of Mr. Thomson and truthfully told plaintiffs expert Dr. 
Shuman that he was knowledgeable as to the local standard of care in Boise, Idaho for 
this particular surgery. The medical records had been sent to his office as attachments 
to an email; it was affirmed by his secretary at trial that they had been received and 
delivered to Dr. Cushman, although key portions of the emails were improperly kept 
from the jury. This subject is covered in more detail in another portion of this brief. 
Had plaintiff known that Dr. Cushman was going to be called as a witness for the 
defense and that he would refute Dr. Shuman's testimony and tell the jury he did not 
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know the local standard of care, had not ever performed this type of surgery or even 
assisted in it, plaintiff could easily have had Dr. Shuman consult with another surgeon 
in Boise, Idaho and make certain this type of recantation would not irretrievably 
damage Mr. Thomson's case. 
Thomson relied upon there being no surprise witness in this case, especially Dr. 
Cushman. Dr. Cushman had been sent the medical records, had agreed to discuss the 
standard of care with Dr. Shuman, and did so by telephone prior to commencement of 
the jury trial, none of which was known to the jury. 
The early Idaho statute on impeachment, C.S. §8036 read: "The party producing 
a witness is not to impeach his credit by evidence of bad character, but he may 
contradict him by other evidence and may also show that he has made at other times 
statements inconsistent with his present testimony." The theories under which evidence 
is considered impeaching and to be admitted is when a party is surprised at the 
unfavorable testimony given by a witness called by himself, the witness is hostile, or the 
party calling that witness has been entrapped to his prejudice. Bodenhamr v. Pacific 
Fruit and Produce Co., 259 Pac. 243, 50 Idaho 248 (Idaho 1931). Evidence which is 
purely and truly evidence to impeach a witness is that which contains statements by a 
witness inconsistent with their testimony at trial. Pierce v. J.C. Penney Co., 167 Cal. 
Apps. 2nd 3; 334 P.2d 117, quoted in Gem Valley Ranches, Inc., v. Small, 411 P.2d 943, 
90 Idaho 354 (Idaho 1966). It has been stated that witnesses can only be impeached by 
proof of contradictory statements of a material fact. State v. Jones, 62 Idaho 552, 113 
P.2d 1106 (1941). Testimony by one witness that another witness was or was not telling 
the truth when they made a particular statement is not admissible evidence. State v. 
Radebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993). The present Rules of Evidence, and 
specifically Rule 607 and Rule 608 do not expand the nature of what constitutes 
impeachment versus rebuttal evidence. However, when the identity of a witness is 
tardily disclosed, the trial judge should request an explanation of the late disclosure, 
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weigh the importance of the testimony in question, determine the time needed for 
preparation to meet the testimony, and consider the possibility of a continuance. 
Wiseman v. Schaffer, 115 Idaho 537, 768 P.2d 800 (Ct.App. 1989). The Court did none 
of this. There was no good cause shown for not advising Mr. Thomson's counsel that Dr. 
Cushman was going to be called as a witness; the Court should have excluded Dr. 
Cushman. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 
(2000). Evidence that repels, counteracts or disproves evidence given by a particular 
witness is properly "rebuttal". State v. Mundell, 158 P.2d 799, 66 Idaho 339 (Idaho 
1945). Since the adoption of Idaho Rules, the distinction between impeachment and 
rebuttal witnesses has been somewhat blurred in that Rules of Evidence 607 and 608 
addressing witnesses do not differentiate between impeachment versus rebuttal 
witnesses. However, the intent of the Rules as well as the rules of discovery is to prevent 
trial by ambush. If a party knows of a material witness whom it will call at trial, the 
opposing party is entitled to know that witness and the proposed testimony prior to the 
commencement of the trial so as not to be surprised and prejudiced. Olsen will argue 
that since Dr. Shuman's testimony was not entirely struck by the Court, there was no 
prejudice. That can hardly be the case, considering that Dr. Shuman was the only 
witness addressing the standard of care; he was Thomson's only medical expert. 
As explained in the next section, the prejudice and error were compounded by the 
court keeping from the jury a key part of an email sent to Dr. Cushman's office. Added 
together, the rulings deeply prejudiced Thomson's case. 
III. DOCUMENTS OFFERED TO REBUT AND IMPEACH THE 
TESTIMONY OF DR. AUSTIN CUSHMAN SHOULD HA VE BEEN ALLOWED 
INTO EVIDENCE. 
Prior to the date Dr. Shuman telephoned Dr. Cushman, Thomson's counsel sent 
to Dr. Cushman's office the medical records and reports of Mr. Thomson; there would 
be no question when Dr. Shuman talked to Dr. Cushman that they were talking about 
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the standard of care for the exact surgery in question. As previously stated, Dr. 
Cushman insisted that he knew nothing about the surgery in this case, had never done 
it, and could not have told Dr. Shuman the applicable standard of care for Dr. Olsen. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit #85 was an email to Dr. Shuman's office with attached medical 
reports including the operative report, the Mayo Clinic Reports, and the CV of Dr. 
Shuman. The affidavit of Barbara Forrest that authenticated this email (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit #84) should have been admitted into evidence. See, In the Interest of F.P., --
A.2d --, 2005 WL 1399264 (Pa.Super., June 15, 2005). 
The standard for authenticating computer records is the same as for 
authenticating other records. The degree of authentication does not vary simply 
because a record happens to be (or has been at one point) in electronic form. See United 
States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889, 893 n.11 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Vela, 673 
F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir.1982). But see United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 
1977) (stating in dicta that "the complex nature of computer storage calls for a more 
comprehensive foundation"). For example, witnesses who testify to the authenticity of 
computer records need not have special qualifications. The witness does not need to 
have programmed the computer himself, or even need to understand the maintenance 
and technical operation of the computer. See United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 915 
(1st Cir. 1991) (citing cases). Instead, the witness simply must have first-hand knowledge 
of the relevant facts to which he or she testifies. See generally United States v. 
Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 601 (1h Cir. 1997) (FBI agent who was present when the 
defendant's computer was seized can authenticate seized files); United States v. Miller, 
771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (telephone company billing supervisor can 
authenticate phone company records; Moore, 923 F.2d at 915 (head of bank's consumer 
loan department can authenticate computerized loan data.) 
Courts generally permit computer-stored records to be admitted as business 
records according to Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 
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910, 914 (1st Cir. 1991; United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1988) . Other 
circuits have articulated doctrinal tests specifically for computer records that largely 
(but not exactly) track the requirements of Rule 803(6). See, e.g., United States v. 
Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Computer business records are 
admissible if (1) they are kept pursuant to a routine procedure designed to assure their 
accuracy; (2) they are created for motives that tend to assure accuracy (e.g., not 
including those prepared for litigation); and (3) they are not themselves accumulations 
of hearsay.") (quoting Capital Marine Supply v. M/V Roland Thomas II, 719 F.2d 104, 
106 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (1h Cir. 1990) 
(computer-stored records are admissible business records if they "are kept in the course 
of regularly conducted business activity, and [that it] was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make records, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness.") (quoting United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308, 311 (7h Cir. 
1983)). Notably, the printout itself may be produced in anticipation of litigation without 
running afoul of the business records exception. The requirement that the record be 
kept "in the course of a regularly conducted business activity" refers to the underlying 
data, not the actual printout of that data. See United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 
190 (5th Cir. 1984). Also see, Sea-Land Serv, Inc v Lozen International, LLC, 285 F.3d 
808, 821 (9th Cir. 2002). 
The excluded exhibit is attached to this Brief and reads as follows: 
Bonnie: 
I have attached the Operative Report, the Mayo Clinic Report and the 
C. V. of Dr. Shuman. 
Dr. Cushman would potentially talk by telephone with Dr. Shuman 
regarding the surgical case; Dr. Cushman will not be an expert for any side 
and will not be called to testify. 
Dr. Shuman simply needs to talk with Dr. Cushman and see what he 
thinks of the phrenic nerve compromise that caused the paralyzed 
diaghram[sic] in this unfortunate fellow. 
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I will forward to you any required retainer or you can bill me after they 
talk; whatever you prefer. 
If Dr. Cushman can do this, I will have Dr. Shuman give him a call; 
probably in the next couple of weeks. 
You can just email me back. 
Many Thanks! 
Lee (Plaintiffs Proffered Exhibit #85, not admitted) 
This email was received by Dr. Cushman's office on November 1, 2005. It 
confirms that Dr. Shuman would be talking to Dr. Cushman "about the surgical case"; 
that the discussion would include talking with Dr. Cushman to "see what he thinks of 
the phrenic nerve compromise that caused the paralyzed diaphragm in this unfortunate 
fellow". More simply stated, Dr. Shuman's telephone call would not have been simply a 
"cold call". It refuted Dr. Cushman's testimony; Dr. Cushman had indeed discussed 
with Dr. Shuman this particular case and the standards involving phrenic nerve 
compromise causing a paralyzed diaphragm. When cross-examined by Mr. Schlender, 
Dr. Cushman told the jury the following: 
"Q. Now, certainly at that time, your testimony here is today that you 
were not aware of the phone call involving pericardial cysts; is that right? 
"A. I don't know about that, no. 
"Q. And you told the jury you don't recall. He didn't ask you about it. 
There was no mention of anything about pericardial cysts. Right? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And there was no mention anything about the phrenic nerve. 
Right? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And you hadn't reviewed any records of this particular case, nor had 
you reviewed a CV of Dr. Shuman had you? 
"A. No. 
"Q. And you had not seen any records from the Mayo Clinic before you 
talked to Dr. Shuman either, had you? 
"A. No. 
MR. SCHLENDER: Your Honor, I offer into evidence, as per the citations 
I give you - and if necessary I can call his secretary who we subpoenaed 
and who is outside - the affidavit with the attachments. 
THE COURT: Well, I haven't had an opportunity to review this. Has 
counsel had an opportunity to review this affidavit? 
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MR. HALL: No, Your Honor. It was just handed to me. 
THE COURT: You want the affidavit into evidence? 
MR. SCHLENDER: I want the affidavit and the attachments to it in 
evidence, or alternatively the documents which are attached through 
Exhibit A and Exhibit B. (TR. Vol. I, p. 884, L. 14 - p. 885, L. 24) 
The Court first indicated that Exhibit 85, the email describing what Dr. Cushman had 
been sent to review, which included the operative report describing the pericardia} cyst 
surgery, would be allowed and admitted into evidence. (TR. Vol. I, p 893 L. 1 -17.) 
Prior to calling to the stand the secretary to whom the critical Exhibit 85 email 
was sent, counsel asked Dr. Cushman the following: 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Dr. Cushman, do you have a Bonnie Lee who 
works in your office? 
"A. I do. 
"Q. Is your E-mail address cableone.net? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Is Bonnie Lee a nurse or someone else in your office? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. How long has she been with you? 
"A. Twelve years. 
"Q. And would you rely upon her to transmit to you or give to you 
anything that needs to come to your attention? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you would not anticipate that she would ever try to hide or 
conceal anything from you? 
"A. No. 
"Q. In your experience with Bonnie Lee, has she always been truthful? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And we could rely upon her to be able to tell us truthfully about 
anything you knew about this case. Correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And as I understand your testimony, you were not given -
you did not receive, nor did you review the Thomson operative 
report before your testimony today; is that right? 
"A. That's right. (TR., Vol. I., p. 894, L.25 - p. 897 L. 15.) 
Bonnie Lee, secretary to Dr. Cushman, was then called to testify about the email 
and the documentation which Dr. Cushman denied having reviewed. Thomson's 
counsel laid a foundation for admission of the email: 
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"DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SCHLENDER: 
"Q. Could you state your name please. 
"A. Bonnie J. Lee, L-e-e. 
"Q. And where are you employed? 
"A. Dr. Austin Cushman. 
"Q. And were you employed by Dr. Cushman in November 1 of 2005? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And are you an RN? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You're a -
"A. I'm a CNA, nursing assistant. 
"Q. CNA? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. In your duties at Dr. Cushman's, do you have an E-mail address? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And is your E-mail address BonnieL@cableone.net? 
HA. Yes. 
"Q. Still is? 
(~A. Yes. 
"Q. Do you have any independent recollection, without any paper being 
put before you, of receiving E-mail from my office? 
"A. No. 
"Q. And do you have any independent recollection of having documents 
sent to your office from me, attached to an E-mail? 
"A. No. 
MR. SCHLENDER: May the witness be handed Plaintiffs marked Exhibit 
#85? 
(Document handed to the witness.) 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Have you had a chance to review it? 
"A. Yes, I have. 
"Q. Now that you have looked at it, does it help to refresh your 
memory? 
"A. You know, I think I do remember something from this Dr. Shuman, 
but I probably just gave it directly to Dr. Cushman. 
"Q. And do you recall what it was - reviewing that document, do you 
recall the subject matter as stated therein now? 
"A. I do. I do - Dr. Shuman, that what I remember, that name. 
"Q. Did you receive in your office, as best as you recall, the documents 
that are mentioned in there? 
"A. You know, I would think so. And I would just stamp them 
and put them on Dr. Cushman's desk. It's nothing that I read. 
"Q. Because that is your E-mail? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Is it not? 
"A. Yes 
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:Q. And then you would have, as best you recall, you gave 
those documents to Dr. Cushman? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And do you recall, the documents you would have given 
him, would they be the same ones as listed there on that E-mail? 
"A. I would think so, if that's what I received. 
"Q. and you have no reason to believe you didn't receive that E-mail? 
"A. No. It was just so long ago I can't remember. 
"Q. What were the documents? 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that as calling for 
speculation. This witness, all she has is an E-mail. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. If the witness has a present 
memory that enables her to answer that question, she may do so. If she 
doesn't have a present memory, she may refresh her recollection by 
reviewing any number of things. Go ahead and ask away, Mr. Schlender. 
MR. SCHLENDER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Do you have a present memory of what came 
with the E-mail? 
"A. I don't. When it has to do with our patient and something else that 
I'm not involved in, I just put it on Dr. Cushman's desk. 
"Q. Now, reviewing that document, and what it says was attached, what 
was it you would have put on Dr. Cushman's desk? 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I still think it calls for speculation on the part of 
this witness. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Do you recall putting anything on Dr. 
Cushman's desk? 
"A. I don't at this time. 
"Q. You don't have an independent recollection of it? 
"A. No, I don't. 
MR. SCHLENDER: Your Honor, I offer that document to refresh her 
memory. 
THE COURT: Well, the witness has reviewed the document in order to 
attempt to refresh her memory, and that document has either served the 
purpose of refreshing her memory or it hasn't. 
You may ask. 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: It has not refreshed your memory? 
"A. No, no. 
"Q. But you don't deny you received it? 
"A. I really can't remember. 
"Q. Other that what you have already testified? 
"A. Right, Right. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to allow the document to go into evidence. 
(TR. Vol.I, p. 903 L. 15 - p. 907, L.3) 
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Bonnie Lee confirmed by her return E-mail (Exhibit 86) that Dr. Cushman had, 
indeed read not only the e-mail but the attachments: 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Now that you have looked at that, do you 
remember that, sending me that E-mail? 
"A. I do. And what I put on here is exactly what Dr. Cushman told me -
how to respond -
"Q. Told you how to respond? 
"A. -- or suggested to give the times that he was available. 
"Q. So before you sent that E-mail back to me, you talked with Dr. 
Cushman? 
"A. Um-hmm. 
"Q. And what did you tell me with regard to Dr. Cushman? 
"A. What it says here on the E-mail. 
"Q. And would you tell me what it says. 
"A. That he reviewed the information, and - when Dr. Shuman would 
be calling, and which days Dr. Cushman was in surgery and be in the 
office. And that if he needed any further information to contact me. 
"Q: Is that exactly what that says, what you wrote? 
"A. Do you want me to read it? 
"Q. Yes. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, it's not in evidence yet. 
THE COURT: I think there probably has now been a sufficient foundation 
laid. I will allow the witness to - I'll allow you to move the admission of 
that single document at this time, if you would like to Mr. Schlender; and 
then and only then can she read from it. 
MR. SCHLENDER: I would move for the admission of it. 
THE COURT: Is there any objection to the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit 
-was it 87? 
MR. SCHLENDER: 86. 
THE COURT: 86. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, 86 includes 85, that you just denied admission 
of. 
THE COURT: Well, 85 is written by somebody other than this witness. 
Correct? 
MR. HALL. Correct. 
THE COURT: That doesn't come in. 86 can come in, but you'll have to 
excise the other E-mail. (TR. Vol.I, p. 909 L. 9 - p 911, L.5.) 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Would you please read what you wrote back. 
"A. "Dr. Cushman reviewed all the information you sent and 
has agreed to do this. Please let us know the date and time Dr. 
Shuman will be calling. 
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"Dr. Cushman is in surgery Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday 
mornings. He normally is not in on Mondays and some Thursday 
mornings. 
The best time would be on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday 
afternoons. If you need any other information, please do not hesitate to 
contact me. 
"Q. And when you say, he "has agreed to do this", are you referring to 
something? 
A. I would think it would be the talking with Dr. Shuman. 
(TR. Vol.I, p. 911 L.14 - p. 912 L.5.) (emphasis added) 
Dr. Cushman stated emphatically he had not seen the operative report, he had 
not reviewed the Mayo Clinic records, nor Dr. Shuman's curriculum vitae. His 
secretary, Bonnie Lee, stated that she gave "those documents" to Dr. Cushman. Counsel 
specifically asked her, "Now, reviewing that document and what it says was attached, 
what was it you would have put on Dr. Cushman's desk?" The Court sustained an 
objection to that question; the jury never did know that Dr. Cushman had, indeed, been 
given the Thomson medical records, operative report and Dr. Shuman's CV, which 
would have totally impeached Dr. Cushman's testimony that he had neither seen nor 
reviewed them prior talking to Dr. Shuman about exactly the type of surgery described 
in the operative report. 
Wide latitude should have been allowed in cross-examination of these 
important witnesses to show bias and to test the credibility of Cushman and his 
secretary. State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748. The Idaho Rules of Evidence 
reflect a heightened concern for a truth-seeking objective of a trial and substantially 
broaden the challenge of the credibility of a witness. State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 752 
P.2d 632; Morford v. Brown, 85 Idaho 480, 381 P.2d 45 (written statement of witness 
not admitted but witness was cross-examined as to the contents of the written 
statement). 
This was a critical and pivotal point in the trial. Dr. Cushman had not been listed 
as a witness, contrary to the pre-trial order of the Court. Once he denied advising 
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plaintiffs expert witness as to the standard of care and that he had reviewed the medical 
records of the case, the testimony of Dr. Shuman was damaged, to say the least. 
Cushman's secretary testified that she had given Dr. Cushman the records; the court 
refused to allow the jury to know what medical records and operative reports had been 
given to Cushman to review prior to Shuman telephoning him. If the jury had known 
they had discussed not a generalized standard of care for this operation but in fact the 
exact medical records and surgery performed upon Thomson, the jury would have 
known the truth: that Dr. Cushman was not telling the truth when he said he had not 
received or reviewed those records; they could have then believed that Dr. Cushman was 
not truthful when he said he did not discuss the standard of care for pericardial cyst 
surgery with Dr. Shuman. This was a fundamental error and in and of itself mandates 
that Thomson be allowed a new trial. Categorizing Dr. Cushman as an impeachment 
witness did not exempt him from disclosure prior to commencement of the trial. 
Medical malpractice cases turn on the plaintiffs expert's ability to ascertain the local 
standard of care from a generally hostile community of local doctors who do not 
cooperate with plaintiffs' malpractice attorney. There is no public policy argument for 
encouraging trial by surprise. Thomson could have found another doctor to discuss the 
local standard of care with Dr. Shuman. This tactic increases the transactional cost of 
litigation and encourages sandbagging; each party is required to hire more experts and 
have those experts consult with more local doctors in order to guard against this tactic. 
Finally, it encourages attorneys to "lay traps" for one another and have numerous 
impeachment witnesses available. This case is an excellent example of that tactic and 
problem; Thomson's counsel provided proof that the local doctor had indeed reviewed 
the medical records of Thomson which he expressly denied. The trial court's refusal to 
allow that impeachment testimony was devastating to plaintiffs case. 
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IV. EVIDENCE OF MR. THOMSON'S CONSENT TO THE OPERATION 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED 
Thomson did not plead as a cause of action a lack of consent to the operation 
undertaken by Dr. Olsen. Thomson filed a motion in limine requesting that Olsen's 
counsel be barred from mentioning during the trial the consent form(s) signed by Mr. 
Thomson or making any suggestion that consent had been given to the surgery since it 
could be considered by the jury as consenting to negligence; this was the subject of a 
motion in limine. (R. Vol. I, 00138). The Court denied that motion. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 8, L. 
13 - p. 9, L.20). 
The issue of informed consent is entirely separate from that of negligence and is a 
separate cause of action to be both pled and proved during the trial. Foster v. Traul, 141 
Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (Idaho 2005). See, Idaho Code §39 - 4301 et seq; Sherwood v. 
Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991). The actual consent form signed by Mr. 
Thomson was offered by the defense and admitted into evidence. 
"CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. HALL: 
"Q. Good morning, Mr. Thomson. 
"A. Good morning. 
"Q. If at any time you have any difficulty breathing or any problem while 
I'm examining you, please feel free to ask and we can always take a break 
for you if that's necessary. 
"A. Thank you. 
"Q. I've had you handed an exhibit. It's Exhibit No. 105. It's entitled 
Medical Center Consent for Surgery, Anesthesia, and Medical Diagnosis. 
Do you have that document, sir? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And have you ever seen that document before? 
"A. I believe so. 
"Q. In fact, does that document reflect your signature? 
"A. Yes, sir, it does. 
"Q. And that reflects a date that a witness signed that of February 6th, 
2003? 
"A. That's correct. 
"Q. And it also shows that this is a document from St. Luke's Hospital? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And it was a document that you signed prior to the time that you had 
your surgery done by Dr. Olsen. Correct? 
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"A. I don't know that. Is there a time or something. 
"Q. There's a 2-6-03 on there. 
"A. That's the date of my surgery. But is there a time? 
"Q. That's the date that the witness signed, witnessing your signature, on 
February 6th, 2003, at 7:50. 
"A. Okay, so that's the time. So in the morning of my surgery, yeah. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, we would offer Exhibit 105, being the consent 
form signed by Mr. Thomson prior to the surgery that was performed by 
Dr. Olsen. It relates specifically to that surgery. 
"THE COURT: You had an objection. Correct, Mr. Schlender? 
"MR. SCHLENDER: Yes, Your Honor. That consent regards the hospital. 
This case isn't against the hospital. It has nothing to do with the hospital. 
And that is the consent, when the court looks at it, it doesn't say anything 
about Dr. Olsen. 
"THE COURT: Well that goes to the weight, not the admissibility. I'll 
overrule the objection. Defendant's Exhibit 105 is admitted. 
(Exhibit 105 admitted). 
(Tr, Vol. I, p.625, L.1 - p. 627, L.7.) 
Defense counsel asked Dr. Olsen if Mr. Thomson had consented to the surgery: 
"Q. Was Mr. Thomson also - did he sign a consent form for this 
surgery? 
"A. Hedid 
"Q. And that is Exhibit 105, I believe. In that, there's a statement made 
where it refers to the fact that he is authorizing Olsen, Craig which I guess 
is you -
"A. Yes. 
"Q. -- to do a procedure on him, which it looks like it says - it's hard to 
read. Can you read that? 
"A. "Left video-assisted thoracoscopic surgery, resection of 
mediastinal/pericardial cyst". 
"Q. That was the operation you were intending to perform? 
"A. That's the way I listed the operation when we scheduled it. 
"Q. And it then says, "The need, the nature of the procedure, the 
alternatives available, and the reasonable risks related to this procedure 
were explained to me, to my full satisfaction, by the above-named and/or 
designee." That would be referring to you. 
Is it your testimony that you did explain the need, the nature of the 
procedure, or the alternatives and the reasonable risks to Mr. Thomson 
before he consented to his surgery? 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. And it says, "No warranty or guarantee was made as to the result". 
Is that a correct statement? 
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"A. That's correct. 
"Q. And it then goes on to say, "I authorize and direct the above-named 
to arrange for additional services as deemed reasonable and necessary, 
including the administration of anesthetics, radiological procedures, and 
pathological services". 
"A. That's correct." (TR. Vol. I, p. 771 L.9 - p. 772, L.23.) 
If consent to an operation is not an issue, it is manifest error to allow counsel to make it 
a centerpiece of the case. The consent form which was admitted into evidence and read 
to the jury gave a clear inference that Mr. Thomson "assumed the risks" of the surgery to 
which he consented and assumed the risk of negligence. Idaho does not have a case 
directly on point. The closest case to examine the issue is Puckett v. Verska, 114 Idaho 
161, 158 P.3a 937 (Idaho 2007). Therein the district court granted a motion in limine 
and limited the cross-examination of Puckett who brought the suit on the issue of 
informed consent. The district judge had indicated that there was no need to cross-
examine Puckett because the evidence could be construed to mean that she assumed the 
risk of surgery. The district court therein also took steps to remedy the testimony on the 
issue of informed consent and issued a curative instruction. The court in Verska 
reasoned that it was not reversible error where the witness made a statement contrary to 
the motion in Iimine, received an admonishment, and the district court later issued a 
curative instruction. That did not happen in this case. The district court in Verska 
granted the motion to limit the examination of Puckett on informed consent; this Court 
sustained granting the motion in limine on that issue. Thomson submits it should have 
been granted in the instant case, particularly considering the clear implication that Mr. 
Thomson assumed the risks of the surgery. 
The concepts of medical negligence and lack of informed consent are separate 
and distinct. Foster v. Traul, supra. The former involves the physician's duty to 
perform competently at all times. The latter concerns a patient's right to be informed of 
risks that cannot be avoided even through the best of care. As one Ohio Appellate Court 
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recently made clear, "informed consent" is not a defense to a physician's failure to 
render appropriate and competent medical services. Waller v. Aggarwal, 116 Ohio App. 
3d 355 (Trurnbull Co. 1996). 
As appellant correctly contends, the action brought against appellee 
sounded in negligence. It did not sound in battery for a nonconsensual 
procedure. Nor did appellant allege that she was not fully apprised of the 
risks of the procedure. Instead, appellant alleged that appellee negligently 
performed the procedure. The fact that appellee informed appellant that 
injury to the bladder was a possible risk of the procedure could not be a 
defense to the claim of negligence brought by appellant. Thus, the 
admission of evidence pertaining to that issue and references to that issue 
carried great potential for the confusion of the jury. 
As a result, we hold that the references to informed consent made 
during the trial constituted plain error, as they were both apparent on 
their face and prejudicial. 
***** 
With regard to the jury interrogatory, it is clear that the language 
employed demonstrates the confusion of the issues. The fact that 
appellant consented to the procedure and was informed of its risks did not 
result in a "waiver of her rights". It did not grant consent for the 
procedure to be performed negligently, and it did not waive appellant's 
right to recourse in the event the procedure was performed negligently. 
116 Ohio App. At pp. 357-358. 
Also, see Wright v. Kaye, 267 Va. 510, 593 S.E.2d 307 (2004), which held as follows: 
" ... we held that where a lack of informed consent is not in issue in a 
medical malpractice case, evidence of information given to the patient 
concerning the risks of surgery is irrelevant to the sole issue in the case: 
Whether the physician departed from the standard of care. We observed 
that such evidence 'could only serve to confuse the jury because the jury 
could conclude ... that consent to the surgery was tantamount to consent 
to the injury'." Id. at 528-29, 593 S.E.2d at 317. 
The plaintiff did not plead and did not pursue a claim of lack of informed consent 
regarding removal of the pericardia! cyst. The claim was that the phrenic nerve was 
damaged during the operative procedure. Therefore, the testimony and documentary 
evidence pertaining to that issue was totally irrelevant; counsel's questions implied to 
the jury that Mr. Thomson had assumed the risk of the surgery. Assumption of risk is 
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not a defense, even assuming a patient could consent to malpractice. The Idaho cases 
have never so held. Admitting into evidence the consent forms and counsel's cross-
examination was clearly prejudicial to Thomson. 
VI. 
v. 
"KNOWN COMPLICATION" DEFENSE SHOULD HA VE BEEN 
EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff filed a motion in limine on November 21, 2006, two weeks prior to 
commencement of the trial, requesting that the Court rule as follows: 
"Defense counsel and witnesses should not be allowed to make any 
reference in any manner to damage to the phrenic nerve being a "known 
complication" of Dr. Olsen's surgery until an adequate medical foundation 
is provided with support for that proposition and argument which 
otherwise, is mere argument and barred by "Daubert" as interpreted by 
the Idaho decisions." 
The court denied that motion, stating as follows: 
"MR. SCHLENDER: Thank you, Your Honor. The second one was that 
the court had denied our motion in limine regarding the use by the defense 
of what is known as, quote, the known complication, closed quotes, 
defense. 
"THE COURT: What I said was that your suggestion, Mr. Schlender, was 
that or your request was that the court order the defendants to avoid any 
mention of quote, unquote known complications of a particular surgery. 
I denied that motion as well. Obviously with the comment that if an 
expert witness is asked to opine about complications that are common or 
known in this type of surgery, that assuming there's an adequate 
foundation laid for that testimony, that I would allow that testimony. But 
it's difficult sometimes to rule on these objections in a vacuum. So I'll 
have to see how it plays out. 
But to the extent that your motion was rather broadly seeking just a 
black-and-white order saying "no mention of known complications,·· that 
one was denied." (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, L.21 -p.10, L.18.) 
Following the court's ruling, the foundational "known complication" defense had to be 
explored with Dr. Shuman, plaintiffs medical expert: 
"Q. Doctor, now I want to turn to the subject about risks of surgeries. 
First off, did you do a study or a review of literature with respect to what 
would be considered complications or known complications of pericardia! 
cyst surgeries? 
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"A. Yes. 
"Q. And in doing this specific search, what you did, I want to ask you a 
few preliminary questions. 
First, what - are there medical textbooks that are produced for 
physicians and medical students? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And do you read those in medical school? 
"A. Yes, you do. And afterwards. 
"Q. I gather you are taught from textbooks? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And the other materials that you see, from the time you're in medical 
school and through your residence, there are also some textbooks? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And there are also what are called medical journals? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Tell the jury how it comes about - first off, how many specialties are 
there of medicine? 
"A. Hundreds of them, maybe even more than hundreds. 
"Q. And are there journals produced by various organizations for each 
specialty? 
"A. Yes. Tr. Vol. I, p. 310. L.2 -- p.311, L.10 
"Q. Let me ask you a couple questions. First, do you consider the Atlas of 
Thoracoscopic Surgery to be authoritative? 
"A. Yes .... 
"Q. And in the practice of medicine as you do, as you practice medicine, 
would this be a treatise that you would consider as authoritative, and 
something that would assist thoracic surgeons in treating their patients? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Okay, go ahead with what you were going to say, Doctor. 
"A. Well, in that they have chapters on different types of approaches as to 
what type of operation you could do. They talk about the anesthetic, how 
you put the patient to sleep, because you have to collapse one lung to see 
the opposite lung. 
But then they have Chapter 5 is "Complications". 
"Q. Complications of what? 
"A. Complications of video-assisted thoracic surgery, a VATS procedure, 
which was done in this case. 
"Q. Would this be what are called known complications? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Okay, go ahead. I'm sorry. 
"A. It's the only place that I've been able to get a list of, "known 
complications of VATS procedures". And he lists -
"Q. Is there a table? Let me ask you this: Is there a table of those? 
"A. Yes. 
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"Q. Where it just simply lists what all of the known complications are? 
"A. Yes. Tr. Vol.I, p 314, L.10 - p. 315, L.24. 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Now, looking at Plaintiffs Exhibit 46, what 
the jury has before them. Now, this came - this table comes from what 
chapter in the Atlas? 
"A. This is Chapter 5 which is "Complications" in the Atlas of 
Thoracoscopic Surgery. 
"Q. And it lists them, does it not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. I wonder if you would tell the jury, when they're looking at this table, 
what each of these potential complications are, in terms that we can 
understand. 
"A. Right. Number one is hypoxemia, which is low oxygen .... 
Number two is mediastinal compression .... 
Number three, CO2 embolism tension pneumothorax. 
Number four, extra pleural trocar placement .... 
Number five is lung injury. ... 
Number six, trocar damage to the intercostals bundle. 
Seven is parenchymal. That's the lung tissue itself, hemorrhage and 
air leak. ... 
Eight is pneumothorax. . .. 
Arrythmia [sic] is number nine ... . 
Number ten, low blood pressure ... . 
Eleven, hypercarbia. .. . 
Twelve is pain. .. . 
Three [sic], atelectasis .... 
Equipment malfunction. ... 
And things break. ... 
Five, are infections .... 
And then finally, ventilator dependence. 
So basically what they've got is, Dr. Mack has got 16 intraoperative 
complications that occur with exactly the operation that was done by Dr. 
Olsen. And there isn't any mention of phrenic nerve damage because it's 
so easy to visualize the phrenic nerve, and everyone knows that it's there, 
that you - even though it may be in the location of where that cyst could 
be, although in this case it didn't seem that it was, you know that by and 
large you're always going to be able to identify it, see it and preserve it. 
So that's why it is not on this list: Because it is not a 
known complication. It is a complication that can occur only 
because it's in that geographic area of the chest. But it 
shouldn't occur in normal cases. 
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There are some instances where it can occur: In cancer surgery, 
horrible infections, radiation therapy, where you're going in second or 
third operation on the chest, where everything is so scarred. You can 
damage it under those circumstances, and no one would be critical of that. 
But on a first go-around, in this instance, it should have been wel1 
visualized. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 320, L. 12-p. 328, L.22.) (emphasis added) 
With this testimony, plaintiff established a lack of foundation for testimony that 
damage to the phrenic nerve during cyst removal surgery was, as per learned treatises, a 
known risk or complication of the surgery. 
Defense counsel asked his expert witness, Dr. Wood, if damage to the phrenic 
nerve during this surgery was a "known complication": 
"Q. As a part of that, there have been discussion [sic] in this case as to 
whether or not injury to the phrenic nerve is a known complication of 
surgery or the surgery in this case. 
Do you have any opinions with regard to whether or not that - it is 
a known complication, or it is not a known complication?" 
"A. Phrenic nerve injury is definitely a known complication of 
operations - any operations that occur in the vicinity of the phrenic nerve. 
(TR. Vol. I, p. 970, LB) 
Plaintiff's counsel asked that the answer be struck, which was overruled. (TR. Vol.I, p. 
970, L. 19--22). 
Dr. Wood could not cite one authoritative treatise, textbook or article which 
supported his statement that phrenic nerve injury during a pericardia! cyst removal is a 
known complication of the procedure. Excerpts of Wood's testimony are as fol1ow: 
"Q. That isn't my question. My question is, of course - and I'm going to 
show you; we'll get to that. But my question is that phrenic nerve injury 
during a pericardia! cyst procedure, VATS procedure, is a known 
complication of that procedure? 
"A. Yes, it is a known complication. Every thoracic surgeon would 
acknowledge it. 
"Q. Tel1 me the name of the journal and the article that says that. 
"A. The Annals of Thoracic Surgery, an article by Dr. Rene Jancovici." 
(TR., Vol. I, p. 1028, L. 13-24.) 
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... "Q. Doctor, in the one you're talking about, the article you talk about, 
do you agree that it is a relatively authoritative treatise, the Annals of 
Thoracic Surgery? 
"A. No, I don't think authoritative is a good descriptor of any medical 
literature. I don't think our science is exact enough to be considered 
authoritative. 
"Q. Well, how - is the article that you quoted from, do you consider it to 
be an article that is accurate? 
"A. Yes. I think it's a very reasonable article. 
"Q. And it was called, "Complications of Video-Assisted Thoracic 
Surgery, a five-year experience." Correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And in that particular article, the damage to the perinea} nerve, and 
I'll hand it to you if you want to look at it. Nowhere in this article does it 
say it's a known complication of all pericardia} cyst surgeries, does it, 
Doctor? 
"MR. HALL: Your Honor, I think he misspoke. He said perinea] nerve; I 
think you mean phrenic nerve. 
MR. SCHLENDER: If I did, phrenic nerve, you bet. I'm sorry. 
THE WITNESS: It's phrenic, not perineal. And there's nowhere, 
there's not a sentence that says it, to the language that you're 
describing, no. Not in that article. 
(TR. Vol. I, p. 1029 L.20-p. 1030, L.25.) 
... Q. Doctor, that wasn't my question. My question was, can you point us 
to a textbook or article, other than what we've talked about, that says that 
it is a known complication of pericardia} cyst removal, VATS, that the 
phrenic nerve is damaged? Can you point to one? 
A. Yes. 
"Q. Which one? 
"A. There's a number of articles. Can I have the pack that I brought? 
"Q. We'll get to go through these, Doctor, carefully. I'm going to have 
the whole pack in. 
"A. I would like all of that. (TR. Vol. I. p.1036, L.5-18) 
"Q. Doctor, the doctors that wrote these articles, are they learned 
doctors? 
"A. I presume so, yes. 
"Q. Do you think when they write these, they know what they're putting 
down, what they're saying? 
"A. Yes. 
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"Q Anywhere in this article, does it say a risk of this surgery 
for pericardia! cysts is damage to the phrenic nerve? That's the 
question, Doctor. Yes or no? 
"A. It does not say that in those words. 
"Q. Let's pull out your next one. 
"A. The next one is Video-Assisted Thoracoscopic Thymectomy for 
Myasthenia Gravis. That's Internal Medicine Journal 2002. And in this, 
they had 26 patients, one of whom had an injury to the phrenic nerve. 
"Q. Could I see that please, Doctor. I don't happen to have that one. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And the thymectomy is not a pericardia] cyst surgery, is it? 
"A. It is not. It is in exactly the same location as pericardia] cyst 
surgery, however. 
"Q. The thymus is exactly in the same place as a pericardia] cyst? 
"A. Where this pericardia] cyst was, yes. 
"Q. Yes, and on this one it says there was a diathermy injury. Correct? 
"A. Correct. 
"Q. And that means what? 
"A. That means that the cautery that was used resulted in an injury to 
the nerve. 
"Q. And in fact, in this one it says recovered. Right? 
1
'A. Yes. 
"Q. Does this say anywhere in this article, does this say 
anywhere in here, does it say that it is a known risk or 
complication of pericardia! cyst removal, that the phrenic nerve 
was going to be damaged? Does it say that? 
"A. It does not." 
(TR. Vol.I, p. 1041 L. 21 - p. 1043 L.14) (emphasis added) 
... "Q. Doctor, the question to you was that it is a known complication. It 
can happen absent of negligence. Do you remember Mr. Hall asking you 
that? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And this doesn't - does this article say it can happen in the absence 
of negligence, Doctor? 
"A. It's unusual that physicians write in their scientific articles about 
negligence. So I would presume that this injury was not related to 
negligence. There's nothing to suggest that it was. 
"Q. And there's nothing to suggest that it wasn't is there? 
"A. No. We don't have the details of that single case. But the case 
certainly exists. 
"Q. Next. 
"A. The next one is an article by Uchiyama in the Annals of Thoracic 
Surgery called Infrasternal Mediastina Scopic Thymectomy and 
Myasthenia Gravis Surgical Results in 23 Patients. 
And this series also had a phrenic nerve injury in one patient. 
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"Q. May I see it, please, Doctor. 
(Document handed to Mr. Schlender) 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: It says in this particular one, this is a 
thymectomy again, is it not? 
"A Y: "t. 
. es, I IS. 
"Q. This is complete removal of the thymic gland. Right? 
"A. Correct. (TR. Vol. I, p. 1047 L.15 - p. 1048 L. 22) 
... "Q.Doctor, in all of the surgeries of cardiothoracic surgery, what does 
that cover? Cardiothoracic surgery covers surgery and what areas of the 
human body? Start enumerating them for us. 
"A. It's surgery in the chest, which includes the heart, mediastinum, 
airway, lung, esophagus and chest wall. 
"Q. And the mediastinum is divided into various areas, is it not? 
"A. Yes, it is. 
"Q. And each one has peculiar organs in it or structures in it, does it 
not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And the lungs are certainly - surgery on the lungs is a whole area 
itself of surgery, is it not? 
"A. It's a part of cardiothoracic surgery, yes. 
"Q. And in all of those surgeries on all of the parts that you've talked 
about, the incidence of a phrenic nerve having any problems is 1.4, is it 
not? 
"A. That's correct. 
"Q. Incidentally, in this particular one article, this says nothing about 
pericardia! cyst, does it? 
"A. No. 
"Q. And it doesn't say a known complication of removing a 
pericardia! cyst is damage to the phrenic nerve, does it? 
"A. It does not say that. (TR., Vol. I, p. 1052 L.9 - p. 1053 L.15.) 
... "Q. But you agree with me, mammary vessel harvest is not operating on 
pericardia! cysts, is it, Doctor? 
"A. It is not, no. 
"Q. Now, in that, you say there are 53 injuries. I want to read to you the 
next sentence. "There was no phrenic nerve injury in noncoronary surgery 
or coronary surgery using conduits other than the internal mammary 
artery." Isn't that what it says? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. 2,084 patients? 
"A. 2,084 patients with 53 injuries. 
"Q. It says there was no phrenic nerve injury in noncoronary 
surgery. Isn't that what it says, Doctor? 
"A. Yes. (TR. Vol.I, p. 1056 L.9 - p. 1057 L. 3.) (emphasis added) 
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"A. The next one is quite different, but I think is relevant. And it's an 
article by a surgeon named Akata, A-k-a-t-a. It's called 
Hemidiaphragmatic Paralysis Following Subclavian Vein Catheterization, 
published in 1997. This is a case report that's relevant because this is just 
from sticking a needle into a blood vessel in the vicinity of the phrenic 
nerve that resulted in complete paralysis to demonstrate that phrenic 
nerve paralysis can occur in very minor areas of trama. 
"Q. Can we see the article itself? Could I see it please? 
"A. I have the abstract. I don't have the whole article for you. 
(Document handed to Mr. Schlender.) 
"Q. Subclavian vein catheterization, is that removal of the pericardia! 
cyst? 
"A. That is not removal of the pericardia} cyst. 
"Q. By the way, that doesn't say damage to the phrenic nerve 
is a known complication of pericardia} cyst surgery, does it, 
Doctor? 
"A. It does not. 
(TR. Vol. I, p. 1058 L. 7 - p. 1058, L.6.) (emphasis added) 
... "Q. That's all right. In any event, have you ever testified in front of a 
jury in a case and said that the phrenic nerve is destroyed as a known 
complication ofpericardial cyst surgery? 
"A. I don't think I've testified in a pericardial cyst case before, no. 
"Q. Never? 
"A. Not that I recall, no. 
"Q. Doctor, I have your CV here, and it is indeed thick and impressive. 
But let me ask you this question. 
Of all the things in here, have you ever written that a 
known complication of pericardia} cyst surgery is destroying the 
phrenic nerve? 
"A. Not that I recall, no." 
(TR. Vol. I, p. 1063 L. 6-21.)(emphasis added) 
Dr. Wood could not point to one article, treatise or textbook which supported his 
bold conclusion that injury to the phrenic nerve during this surgery is a "known 
complication". 
If there was any question that the "known complication" defense was pivotal to 
this case we need only consider the following closing argument to the jury by defense 
counsel: 
(MR. HALL) "What was the issue in the case? Well, the issue is pretty 
simple. It's whether the phrenic nerve was injured because Dr. Olsen's 
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care fell below the standard of care. And we have offered proof in this case 
as to what happened to the phrenic nerve and as to how it happened. 
Mr. Schlender said make them prove it. Well, we proved it. We 
have proved that the phrenic nerve injury is a known risk of this 
surgery. We have proved it through Dr. Olsen who testified that 
in his training, it was a known risk of surgery. 
We proved it through Dr. Wood, who came into this court and told 
you that if he had a person who was a resident, somebody trying to become 
a board certified resident, a board certified doctor, and he was asked the 
question of whether or not phrenic nerve injury is a known risk of surgery 
for a pericardia} cyst, and that person told him no, he said he would flunk 
that person. That's how clear, that's how basic, that's how important that 
concept really is. 
And the witnesses who testified, Dr. Olsen, Dr. Wood, Dr. 
Orme, Dr. Symmonds, Dr. Lee, and the literature all establish 
that principle. 
I think probably one of the more interesting moments of the trial 
was when Mr. Schlender was trying to argue with Dr. Woods about what 
the literature said or didn't say. And you'll remember that Dr. Woods 
would say well, I found this article. It says the phrenic nerve is basically a 
known risk." (TR. Vol. I, p. 1241 L. 7 - p. 1242 L.14.)(Emphasis added) 
There was no foundation provided the other defense witnesses that injury to the 
phrenic nerve was a known risk of this procedure. For instance, consider the testimony 
of Dr. Olsen, the defendant: 
"Q. Now, you heard Dr. Shuman testify that, as to the issue of whether 
or not injury to the phrenic nerve could be a known risk of this procedure. 
Do you have an opinion as to whether injury to the phrenic nerve 
would be a known risk of this procedure? 
"A. Yes, I do. 
"Q. And what is that opinion? 
"A. Anytime you're operating near the phrenic nerve -
"MR. SCHLENDER: Objection, Your Honor. He asked about this 
procedure, not "anywhere near the phrenic nerve". 
"THE COURT: Overruled. 
"Q. BY MR. HALL: Go ahead. 
"A. I knew I was going to be operating near the phrenic nerve, within 
perhaps even millimeters of it. And so yes, there was most definitely a risk 
of injury to the phrenic nerve. (TR. Vol. I, p. 768 L.13 - p. 767 L. 7.) 
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Dr. Orme who assisted in the surgery chimed in adding his observation without 
foundation that damage to the phrenic nerve was a known risk: 
"Q. Now, as an assistant surgeon involved in this type of surgery, were 
you aware of any known risk or complications with respect to the type of 
surgery being performed on Mr. Thomson? 
"MR. SCHLENDER: Objection. Limited to being an assistant, not the 
surgeon. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The witness may answer the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I was aware. 
"Q. BY MR. HALL: What risks were you aware of? 
"A. Well, in a surgery like this, there's always the risk of bleeding from 
the entry wounds into the chest wall. There's the risk of infection 
occurring in the pleural space, the space between the lung and the chest 
wall. And there would be a risk of an air leak from the lung, and there 
could be a risk of nerve injury. 
"Q. What nerve" 
"A. The phrenic nerve particularly. 
"Q. And why is that a risk? 
"A. Because of its course in the chest. It travels from the neck down 
along the carotid artery and over the arch of the aorta, and then runs along 
the pericardium, the covering of the heart. And it runs from along the 
pericardium down to the diaphragm. 
And so this phrenic nerve is in a region where the cyst was in this 
case, so it could be something that one would look out for." 
(TR. Vol. I, p. 792 L.9 - p. 793, .113.) 
Dr. Symmonds, another defense expert witness, covered the same ground: 
"Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not, in the performance of 
a thoracoscopic mediastinal procedure, the phrenic nerve would constitute 
a known or common risk of the procedure? 
"A. Especially with a cyst in this position, the phrenic nerve is 
immediately adjacent to that cyst, and it is at risk, yes. 
"Q. And you're referring to this specific procedure? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. It that a risk that you would explain to the patient if you were going 
to be doing the surgery? 
"A. I would." (TR. Vol. I, p. 825 L.19 - p. 826, L. 8.) 
In the expert witness disclosure for Dr. Wood, it was stated that he would testify 
damage to the phrenic nerve during various surgeries is a known complication of the 
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surgery; that the phrenic nerve can cease to function or be damaged absent any 
negligence on the part of the doctor; that it is a "known risk" of pericardia] cyst surgery. 
None of this was true. No medical textbook, medical journal or treatise supported such 
speculation. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 has been construed by our Supreme Court to require 
that expert testimony meet a modified criteria of Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In determining whether or not expert 
testimony should be allowed, various factors are to be considered; whether or not the 
theory or technique in question can be tested, whether it has been subject to peer review 
in publication, its known or potential error rate, the existence and maintenance of 
standards governing its use and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within 
a relevant scientific community. The overarching subject of the inquiry is "the scientific 
validity - and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability - of the principles that 
underlay the proposed submission." State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 
(1996); Walker v. American Cyanamid Company, 130 Idaho 824, 948 P.2d 1123 (1977); 
Idaho v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 310, 3 P.3d 535 (Idaho Ap. 2000). 
It has been commonly stated that the trial court is charged with the role of being 
a "gate keeper" and must initially determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to 
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in 
issue. The physician's use of traditional medical technology is important in determining 
whether or not to allow a physician's testimony. Joiner v. G.E., 78 F.3d 531-32. The 
expert's reliance on "anecdotal" evidence as opposed to "imperial" findings decreases 
the reliability of the evidence. Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 921 F. Supp. at 519; 
Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 194. The expert's testimony will be 
particularly suspect when the expert has not conducted any independent research 
outside of the litigation on the subject matter of the expert's testimony. Experts should 
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be rejected whose conclusions have failed to be tested and which have not been subiect 
to scientific scrutiny. Rogers v. Ford Motor Company, 952 F. Supp. at 606. 
An unexplained conflict with a generally accepted scientific theory can be the 
basis for exclusion of medical expert testimony. Turpin v. Merrill Dow Pharms., 959 
F.2d. 1349; O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 807 F. Supp. 1378; Conde v. 
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F. Supp. 972. 
Where an expert's testimony is contradicted by the general level of current 
medical knowledge, the court will abuse this discretion in admitting that expert's 
testimony. Black v. Food Lion, 171 F.3d 308 (Fifth Circuit 1999). 
Prior to the testimony of Dr. Wood or any other expert witness by the defense, 
the Court should have required that the defense make an offer of proof outside the 
presence of the jury, providing the Court with medical evidence that damage to the 
phrenic nerve during pericardial cyst surgery is a known complication. Absent such a 
foundation, the testimony should have been barred. 
Although this Court has not adopted the strict standards for admissibility of 
scientific or other expert witness as set forth in Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2788 (1993), certain elements of Daubert 
have been adopted. For instance, whether a theory of defense has been subjected to 
peer review and publication has been applied even if the theory is not commonly agreed 
upon or generally accepted. Idaho v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998). 
When an expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, there must be likewise a 
scientific basis for that opinion; and if the reasoning or methodology underlying that 
opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinion will not assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue. Swallow v. Emergency Medicine 
of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003). There was a total lack of foundation laid 
with the defense witnesses who testified that damage to the phrenic nerve during 
pericardia! cyst surgery is a "known risk" of that surgery. A "known risk" is exactly that: 
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one which is recognized, taught and discussed in peer reviewed literature, textbooks and 
articles. For example, in addition to the trial testimony already quoted, we find the 
following in the testimony of Dr. Symmonds, one of the defense medical expert 
witnesses: 
"Q: ... If the phrenic nerve was stretched, pulled, banged on, or burnt 
with ultrasound, do you think those are in the standard of care? 
"A. I think the standard of care is to try to avoid doing any of those 
things to the phrenic nerve. 
"Q: And aside of those that you mentioned, you also said sometimes 
there may be no explanation. Right? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. And in this particular case, in removing a pericardial cyst using 
VATS, and the jury knows that that is, I believe you said sometimes it just 
happens without knowing why. Right? 
"A. Correct. 
"Q. What are abstracts? 
"A. They're synopsis [sic] of articles. 
"Q. Did you learn from textbooks how to practice medicine, partially? 
"A. Sure. 
"Q. Do you learn - do physicians, where they have run into a problem 
or a complication, is it in the practice of medicine customary that these 
physicians will write a paper or an abstract on that situation and have it 
published so that other doctors can read that, so that they don't make the 
same mistake? 
"A. That's how we get a lot of our information. 
"Q. That's how medicine works, is it not? In other words, medicine 
works historically. Correct? 
"MR. HALL: Your Honor, object to the form of the question as 
compounded. 
"THE COURT: Sustained. 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Does medicine work historically, Doctor? 
"A. Medicine works by physicians and patients trying to deal with their 
problems, working together I guess. The physicians learn from history by 
studying what has transpired, what other physicians have experienced, 
and basing your practice on other people's experience is only appropriate. 
"Q. And there are hundreds, if not thousands, of medical journals 
published wherein doctors such as yourself and others may write articles, 
abstracts on problems that have arisen in surgeries or procedures. 
Correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And does your group subscribe to some of those? 
"A. Sure. 
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"Q. What are some of the ones you subscribed to? 
"A. The Journal of Vascular Surgery. I read Journal of Thoracic and 
Cardiovascular Surgery, Annals of Thoracic Surgery. We get numerous 
weekly journals that come in the mail even without subscribing to them. 
We get newspapers, newsletters that come out on a weekly basis. 
"Q. And you have had - I don't believe Mr. Hall asked you this, but 
about what time were you asked to work on this case? 
"A. Several months ago. Initially I reviewed the records as a 
preliminary thing, and only in the last month did I get this large box of 
depositions that have been taken recently. 
"Q. You took the time to go through all of those? 
"A. I went through most of them, I guess. 
"Q. And hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of medical records. 
Right? 
"A. It would probably end up being a thousand. 
"Q. In your practice, you have access, to [sic] you not, through 
computers, the Internet, as well as medical universities, I should say 
universities and schools of medicine, you have access to textbooks of 
medicine literally around the world, do you not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you can pull up, if you need to, either you or someone in your 
office can reach databases of literally thousands and thousands of 
abstracts, to try to find something you're interested in. Correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Between the time you were asked to assist on this case, as you sit 
here now before the jury, can you tell the jury, did you find or do you know 
of one abstract, one textbook, one journal, which says that damage to the 
phrenic nerve during pericardia! cyst surgery, being done by VATS, just 
that the damage occurs for just some unknown reason? 
"A. I'm not aware that's written anywhere. 
"MR. SCHLENDER: Thank you, Doctor." 
(TR. Vol.I, p.841 L.14 - p. 845 L.15.) (Emphasis added) 
Dr. Orme, who assisted at the surgery, denied having a learned or scientific basis 
for his statements regarding "known risk" of the surgery: 
"Q. How many phrenic nerve/pericardia! cyst combination, in other 
words where you're next to the phrenic nerve, you're removing a 
pericardia! cyst and you're using the VAT system, how many of those had 
you personally done prior to the time of Mr. Thomson's surgery? 
"A. I don't recall that I had done any, that I had performed -
"Q. Do you have present knowledge that Mr. Thomson was aware that 
the assistant in this operation had never done one of these operations 
before? 
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"A. No, but - no, I've been involved in hundreds of operations on the 
pericardium and around the phrenic nerve, as has Dr. Olsen. 
"Q. Now, getting back to this risk involved. Are you telling the jury that 
the risk of damaging that phrenic nerve in a pericardia! cyst surgery, using 
video-assisted thoracoscopic surgical instruments, that the risk of that 
surgery is such that it is a known complication? 
"A. I don't know of reports linking pericardia! cysts with paralysis of the 
phrenic nerve, but-
"Q. Excuse me just a minute. Let me ask you the questions. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, could he let him finish the answer? 
MR. SCHLENDER: I thought he answered it. 
THE COURT: Well, ask your next question, Counsel. 
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Doctor, as a matter of fact, you don't 
know of one textbook that says that, do you? 
"A. I don't, but I know a lot about phrenic nerve injury -
"Q. Doctor -
"A. -- and I don't need to cite a text to tell you that. 
"Q. I'm talking about a pericardia! cyst removal. Okay? On a 
pericardia! cyst removal, using video-assisted thoracoscopic 
surgery instruments, can you cite to the jury one single article, 
or one single journal, or one single textbook in the history of 
medicine that supports that statement. Yes or no? 
"A. I cannot, but I have not specifically looked for this either. 
"Q. Thank you, Doctor." 
(TR. Vol.I, p.812 L.3-p. 814, L.2.)(Emphasis added) 
This Court in Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 
1180, reversed a ruling that plaintiffs expert witness Dr. Smith in a brain damage case 
was unqualified as an expert to testify as to the cause of the brain damage. Dr. Smith 
had based his opinion not only upon experience but upon his research. As this Court 
noted in its opinion, "He provided many articles as a basis for his opinion .. .. While 
there is no exact known effect of the combination of chemicals infused into Evelyn's 
brain, there is scientifically reliable evidence regarding the effect of increased 
intracranial pressure. Dr. Smith based a portion of his opinion, dealing with the 
mechanical effect of the increased amount of fluid in Evelyn's brain, upon such 
scientifically reliable information." The Court recognized that there are rare 
occurrences where there is not scholarly research but that would only pertain to where 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -40 
there is "otherwise scientifically valid testimony". Such facts do not exist in this case; 
this is not a question of differential diagnosis but whether or not there was medically 
sound evidence based upon known medicine, that damage to the phrenic nerve is a 
"known risk" of pericardial cyst surgery. 
There was no factual basis for the opinions of the experts that damage to the 
phrenic nerve was a known risk of the surgery; not one of them testified that they had 
had a similar situation arise during such surgery. There must be some factual basis for 
the opinion of an expert when an expert expresses a purely personal opinion. Oats v. 
Nissan Motor Corporation in the U.SA., 126 Idaho 162, 879 P.2d 1095 (1994). 
CONCLUSION 
As much as in any case tried to a jury, a medical malpractice case requires that 
both the trial court and counsel run a tight ship. The medical malpractice case reaches 
into the heart and mind in a profound manner; physicians are held in high esteem in our 
society, for good reason. If there is to be a just resolution of the medical case, a level 
playing field is required. An error by the trial court in the admission of evidence which 
would be harmless in the context of garden-variety litigation can be pivotal in a medical 
trial, particularly since the credibility of the plaintiff is being constantly weighed by the 
jury against that of the physician and his finely-tuned expert witnesses. The physician 
does not need an evidentiary advantage. 
Ever since the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1958, they have 
been liberally construed with a just result as the ultimate goal to be accomplished. Sines 
v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 566 P.2d 758 (1977). Substantial prejudice inevitably occurs 
when a key witness is not disclosed as occurred with Dr. Cushman; the error was 
compounded by disallowing counsel to vigorously cross-examine him. Plaintiffs must 
be given the opportunity and rebut the defendant physician's evidence in a medical case. 
Edmunds u. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006). 
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Absent extraordinary circumstances, the written consent of a patient provides for 
the jury conclusive proof that the patient has assumed the risks of surgery and the 
physician is absolved from liability. The Consent to Surgery form is the centerpiece of 
medical malpractice litigation. Counsel for the doctor hammers home with cross-
examination of the patient that the written consent form signed by the plaintiff takes the 
issue of personal responsibility out of speculation and provides a solid foundation for 
the doctor to proceed with the operation, knowing that an educated patient cannot 
thereafter be heard to complain if the surgery produces a bad result. Conversely, if the 
patient concedes that he has been given written explanation and warnings as to the risks 
of the surgery to which he consents, the focus of the evidence should be on whether or 
not the surgical procedure was negligently performed; at least under Idaho law, there is 
no balancing between a surgeon's negligence and the patient "assuming the risk". 
Considering that Thomson did not plead a cause of action of lack of consent for the 
procedure, no evidence was required to prove facts not in issue. While a learned judge 
. may know that the patient does not customarily consent to a negligently performed 
operation, the subtle nuances of the weight of evidence are not appreciated by a jury and 
hence the rule of law that the court must exclude from the trial issues that are unfairly 
and unduly prejudicial unless there is an overriding reason for their admission. In this 
case, clearly there was not such a need to admit into evidence Mr. Thomson's written 
consent to the operation. 
Not one of Dr. Olsen's expert witnesses testified that they had personal 
knowledge and experience of the phrenic nerve being damaged during pericardia! cyst 
surgery. They all simply repeated the mantra prompted by leading questions that 
damage to the phrenic nerve was a "known complication". Dr. Wood attempted to 
buttress his opinion with reference to learned texts, treatises and periodicals on the 
subject of pericardia! cyst removal with damage to the phrenic nerve. However, on 
cross-examination it was conclusively established that not one of the articles that he 
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referenced nor any of the others utilized by Dr. Shuman provided any historical or 
scientific knowledge that damage to the nerve during this particular surgery was a 
known risk or complication. This Court has adopted the standard of a medical theory 
being tested by whether or not it has been subjected to peer review and publication. 
State v. Merwyn, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998). This case is the exact opposite 
of Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, supra, wherein the expert Dr. Smith based 
his opinion upon his experience and research; the court allowed the testimony since Dr. 
Smith "provided many articles as a basis for his opinion". 
This Court approved the logic of the 9th Circuit as expressed in Clausen v. M/V 
New Carissa, 339 Fed.3d 1049 (2003), holding that a trial court was justified in 
excluding the expert's testimony if the expert fails to offer an explanation why an 
alternative cause is ruled out. Applying that logic to the instant case demonstrates 
precisely why the known complication defense should have been excluded. Dr. Wood 
speculated that there was no treatise, textbook or scientific report of damages to the 
_ phrenic nerve during pericardial cyst surgery because pericardia} cyst surgery is the 
same as any other thoracic surgery. (TR. Vol. I, Pp. 1067-1069) That position was 
rejected by all of the medical articles reviewed with Dr. Wood during cross-examination, 
as well as by the medical textbook examples cited by Dr. Shuman. Surgery to remove a 
pericardial cyst by definition was not heart or lung surgery, which is the most often 
visited domain of thoracic surgeons. All of the textbooks and articles that were cited to 
Dr. Wood during his cross-examination stated exactly the opposite: that damage to the 
phrenic nerve during pericardial cyst surgery could and should be avoided. 
Dr. Wood summarized the total lack of foundation for his opinions in the 
following exchange: 
"Q. By Mr. Schlender: Doctor, you were asked about Ken in this case and 
the standard of care had been complied with. Right? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. So he just, what, had bad luck? 
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"A. It appears that way, yes." (TR, Vol. I, p. 1074 L.14-20) 
Bad luck is not normally equated with sound medical and scientific principles. Reliance 
on such conjecture highlights why the "known complication" defense should never have 
been allowed. 
For all of the above stated reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Order 
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